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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-MANAGERIAL
EMPLOYEES-UNIVERSITY FACULTY-The United States Supreme
Court has held that full-time faculty members at Yeshiva University are
managerial employees excluded from the protections of the National
Labor Relations Act.

NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
On October 30, 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association
(Union) filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (Board)' seeking certification as the bargaining agent for
the full-time faculty2 at Yeshiva University.' The University opposed
the petition, claiming that its faculty members were managerial or
supervisory personnel and, thus, not statutory employees within the

meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).' The Yeshiva faculty participated in university governance through their representatives

1. The Board overruled the University's challenge that the Yeshiva Faculty Association was not a "labor organization" as defined in the National Labor Relations Act § 2(5),
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976). Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 n.2 (1975).
2. Full-time faculty included those professors, associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors who carried a full-time teaching load or the equivalent, but excluded part-time faculty, librarians, research associates, research assistants, and emeritus
faculty who were not actively teaching at the University for a fixed one-year period and
who were faculty at another academic institution. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1053.
3. I Yeshiva University is a private university located in New York providing a
variety of arts and sciences programs at five under-graduate and six graduate schools. Of
the 13 schools operated by Yeshiva, only 10 were involved in these proceedings. N.L.R.B.
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674-75 (1980).
4. 444 U.S. at 675. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), provides that "employee" includes "any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer ...

but shall not include ...

any individual employed as a super-

visor...
Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment [shall be deemed a supervisor].
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Supervisors do not have any right to organize or any collective
bargaining rights which are protected by the Act. Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs,
382 U.S. 181, 188 (1965). Although not expressly excluded from the statutory definition of
"employee," managerial employees are denied the organizational protections of the Act by
a judicially defined exclusion. Managerial employees are those persons who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies. NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322
(1946)).
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on university committees. 5 The University contended that the power
exercised by the faculty through the committees reached beyond
strictly academic concerns. The faculty members at each school met
either formally in the faculty committees or informally in meetings
called by their deans to decide matters of institutional and professional
concern.6 The University concluded that through such meetings the
faculty effectively determined the schools' curriculum, grading system,
admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course
schedules.7
Following five months of evidentiary hearings by a Board-appointed
officer, a three-member Board panel granted the Union's representation petition and ordered an election.8 The Board rejected the University's contention that its faculty members were managerial employees,
finding it to be an inappropriate request for reconsideration of
previous decisions. 9 In ordering the election, the Board maintained that
the faculty members were professional rather than managerial
employees because their participation in decision-making was on a collective rather than an individual basis, was exercised in their own interest rather than in the interest of their employer, and because final
authority rested with the board of trustees.10 The Union won the election and was certified by the Board, but the University refused to
bargain, adhering to its position that its faculty members were
managerial employees. 1 The Union brought unfair labor practice proceedings against the University 2 wherein the Board Qrdered the
University to bargain. 3 The University continued to refuse to
negotiate with the Union and the Board sought enforcement of its
5.
6.

221 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
444 U.S. at 676.

7. Id.
8.
9.

221 N.L.R.B. at 1057.
Id. at 1054. See Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971); C.W. Post Center, 189

N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
10. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054. Employees are given the right to organize and to engage in
collective bargaining. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Professionals are, by definition, included in the term "employee." Id. at § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. §
152(12) (1976).
11. Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 (1977), enforcement denied, 582 F.2d 686 (2d
Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 600. The Union charged violations under National Labor Relations Act §
8(aX5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), which makes an employer's refusal to bargain an unfair
labor practice. The Union also alleged violations of National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed under the Act.
13. 231 N.L.R.B. at 600.
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order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."
Finding that the Board had acted arbitrarily in not reaching sufficient factual determinations,'" the court of appeals scrutinized the
available record and concluded that the Yeshiva faculty members were
managerial employees because of their pervasive influence in the
operation of the University.'" The court of appeals did not reject the
Board determination that the faculty members were professional
employees; instead, the court concluded that the faculty's influence in
decision-making procedures was so consistently exercised that the
faculty members could not escape the managerial classification despite
their professional characteristics." Accordingly, the court of appeals
refused to enforce the Board's order,' 8 and the Board petitioned to the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari' 9 to determine whether the full-time faculty
members of Yeshiva University were managerial employees and thus
excluded from the benefits of collective bargaining under the Act.
Justice Powell, writing for the five-member majority," affirmed the
decision of the court of appeals precluding faculty organization because
the faculty members were managerial personnel.' Justice Powell noted
that there is no evidence that Congress has considered whether a
university faculty may organize for collective bargaining under the
Act.' The Court recognized, however, that the absence of explicit con14. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), affd, 444 U.S. 686 (1980). The
Board is empowered to petition any court of appeals for the enforcement of its orders. National Labor Relations Act § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
15. 582 F.2d at 696.
16. Id at 698. The Board's decision was founded on its review of the university-wide
system of governance at Yeshiva. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054. The court of appeals, on the other
hand, examined the authority structure in each of the colleges within the university. 582
F.2d at 690.
17. 582 F.2d at 697.
18. 1& at 703.
19. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
20. 444 U.S. at 674.
21. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in
Justice Powell's majority opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissent in which Justices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Id. at 673.
22. Id at 679.
23. Id When the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) and the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979)), were
passed, the Board concluded that nonprofit institutions were not covered because they did
not effect commerce. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). The Yeshiva
Court rejected the Board's argument that because Congress did not exclude university
faculty when the Act was amended in 1974, the Board's extension of coverage to faculty
was tacitly approved by Congress. 444 U.S. at 681 n.11.
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gressional direction would not preclude the Board from exercising
jurisdiction over any particular type of employment.'
The Court next addressed the applicability of the managerial exclusion to the faculty members." Closely aligned with the statutory exclusion for supervisory personnel, the exclusion for managerial employees
is founded upon the belief that the employer is entitled to the undivided
loyalty of his employees when those employees represent management
interests or implement management policies." In applying this standard
to Yeshiva's faculty, the Board argued that the faculty members exercised independent professional judgment and were not aligned with the
University's managementY Because of this independence, the Board
concluded that there was no danger of divided loyalty and hence no
need to apply the managerial exclusion."' The Court noted, however,
that the Board had not applied this reasoning in reaching its decision,
but had relied upon previous Board decisions involving faculties. In its
previous decisions, the Board had concluded that faculty members were
not managerial because their authority was collective, exercised in their
own interest, and subject to the final authority of the board of
trustees.' The Court stated that these previous Board decisions had only dimly foreshadowed the independent professional judgment analysis
now espoused by the Board. 0
In rejecting the Board's independent professional judgment argument, the Court determined that the faculty's unquestionable
managerial authority in academic matters was absolute." The Court
24. 444 U.S. at 681. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. ill (1944). The
Board had previously approved bargaining units composed of faculty members. See, e.g.,
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B 639 (1972); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971).
25. 444 U.S. at 682, 686 n.23. The majority never reached the issue of whether the
Yeshiva faculty members were supervisory personnel, and rested its decision solely upon
the finding that the faculty members were managerial employees. Id at 682.
26. Id. at 682. See note 4 supra. The exclusion of managerial personnel from coverage
under the Act is further justified because managers are higher in the company hierarchy
than their supervisory counterparts who are explicitly excluded. Hence the rationale for
excluding supervisors applies with even greater force to managerial employees. 444 U.S.
at 682.
27. 444 U.S. at 684. The Board contended that professional employees often appear to
be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties,
and, therefore, their status must be determined by examining their alignment with
management. Id at 683-84.
28. Id. at 684.
29. Id. See, e.g., University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974).
30. 444 U.S. at 684. See Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971);. C.W. Post Center,
189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
31. 444 U.S. at 686. See Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of
Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28 (1972). In its argument
in Yeshiva, the Board abandoned the collective authority branch of the three-part test as
well as the argument that final authority rested in the board of trustees. 444 U.S. at 685.
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observed that the application of the independent professional judgment
test was inconsistent with prior Board decisions which had applied the
managerial and supervisory exclusions to professionals without inquiring whether their decisions were based on management policy rather
than professional expertise 2 ' Thus, because the Board did not suggest
that the test be limited to university faculty, the Court reasoned that
the suggested approach would result in the implicit overruling of Board
precedent and the potential, indiscriminate recharacterization of professionals as nonmanagerial.Y Moreover, the Court determined that the application of the independent professional judgment standard was based
upon an unfounded belief that the faculty's professional interests could
be separated from the institutional interests of the University. The
business of a university is education, and an interest in that business is
as much a concern of the faculty as it is a concern of the university.
After determining that the interests of the university and the faculty
were the same, the Court concluded that unionization of the Yeshiva
faculty would result in divided loyalties. Because the faculty strives for
academic excellence and because the university depends to a great extent upon the participation of the faculty to determine and implement
academic policies, unionization would place the faculty members in a
tenuous position whenever their interests as employees differed from
the interests of the university as an academic institution. 5
Stating that it did not intend to exclude all professionals from the
Act's coverage, the Supreme Court declared that it would limit
coverage to professionals whose activities were the same as those
routinely exercised by other professionals similarly situated. The Court
cited with approval cases wherein the Board upheld the employee status
of nonacademic professionals whose decision-making was a routine
discharge of professional duties in projects to which they had been
assigned even if union membership could involve some divided loyalty.'
These decisions, the Court concluded, should serve as a guide when the
Board must determine whether an employee's activities align him with
management. The Court pointed out that these guidelines are merely a
32. 444 U.S. at 687. Using the industrial analogy to the extent applicable, the Court

concluded that the faculty determined the product to be produced, the terms upon which
it would be offered, and the customers which it would serve. Id at 686.
33. Id. at 688. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); University of Ver-

mont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1975);
University of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220 (1973), enforced, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir.

1974).
34. 444 U.S. at 688.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 690 n.30. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); Wurster,
Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1971); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 192
N.L.R.B. 920 (1971).
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starting point and that each case must be determined upon its particular facts. 7
Finally, the Court rejected the Board's contention that because of
the deference to be accorded to its expertise, the decision of the court
of appeals should be overturned. Finding the Board's decison to be
without a rational basis and inconsistent with the Act, the Court concluded that it was not worthy of such deference. 8 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's rejection of the Board's
petition and determined that full-time faculty members at Yeshiva
were managerial employees and not within the coverage of the Act. 9
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent,"0 believed that the Board's decision was neither irrational nor inconsistent with the Act."1 He contended
that because the Act itself did not address the issue of faculty status,
the Board had the discretion to determine the applicable standards.
Even if the deference accorded to Board decisions was insufficient to
preclude the Court from reviewing its determination, Justice Brennan
argued, the Board's conclusion was the correct one. Agreeing with the
majority's conclusion that the faculty's authority, if exercised in
another context, would necessarily be managerial in nature, the
dissenter argued that the university setting was not the equivalent of
"another context."'3 Maintaining that managerial status is determined
by whether the employee's duties represent his own interests or those
of his employer, Justice Brennan noted that the Board had compiled a
lengthy record before deciding that the faculty members acted in their
own interest."
Instead of focusing on the power exercised by the faculty and analogizing it to an industrial context, Justice Brennan examined the
structure of the modern university and concluded that the faculty exercised collective expertise as professional educators to serve its own
independent interest in creating the most effective environment for
learning, teaching, and scholarship. 5 He noted that although the
37. 444 U.S. at 690 n.31.
38. Id at 691. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
39. 444 U.S. at 691.
40. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
41. Id. at 692 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recognizing the difficulties of applying a
statute designed for the industrial workplace to the academic community, the dissenter
maintained that Congress committed to the Board the responsibility of balancing interests
to effectuate national labor policy. Id. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
44. 444 U.S. at 696 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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university often defers to the expertise of the faculty in formulating
academic policy, the administration is governed by its own interests in
fiscal and other management policies.'" The dissenter pointed out that
in order to conclude that faculty members are managerial, the Board
must find that they are answerable to some higher authority. 7 Because
faculty members are free to voice their concerns without fear of repercussion, they are distinguishable from managers in an industrial context who are subject to higher authority. Faculty members are not
hired to enforce policies, nor are they retained because of their loyalty
to those policies. 8 Instead, consistent with academic freedom, faculty
members are hired and retained because of their abilities in the
classroom.'9 Justice Brennan concluded that a mere coincidence of interests on many issues does not preclude the faculty's right to collective bargaining on issues of disagreement.0
Finally, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's perception of the
modern university as a vestige of the great medieval university, 1 and
contended instead that universities are big businesses faced with the
same financial concerns as other businesses. 2 Based upon this picture of
contemporary collegiality, Justice Brennan concluded that the collective
bargaining process could lead to peaceful resolution of those areas over
which the university and the faculty disagree, and criticized the
majority's decision as interfering with peaceful resolution.'
The National Labor Relations Board first exercised jurisdiction over
private colleges and universities in Cornell University" wherein the
bargaining rights of nonacademic personnel were recognized. Cornell
University overruled a long-standing Board policy of noninterference
in the administration of private colleges and universities. One year
46. Id at 697-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id
49. Id. at 700 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that the Board
had at times excluded certain faculty members from collective bargaining because they
represented the university's interest rather than that of the faculty. Id. at 699 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423, 425 (1976) (department chairmen excluded); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974) (deans excluded).
50. 444 U.S. at 700-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B.
247, 256 (1975) (Kennedy, Board member, concurring).
51. 444 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 702-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 704-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Examples of conflicting economic concerns
include declining enrollments and budgetary cutbacks which force the university to act as

efficiently as possible. This interest of the university runs counter to the interest of the
faculty in compensation, job security, and working conditions. Id.
54. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).

55. Id. at 334.
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later in C.W. Post Center,56 the Board was faced with the question of
faculty unionization. The Board concluded that although the authority
and policy-making exercised by the faculty was quasi-supervisory, the
faculty members were not supervisors within the meaning of the Act
because their authority was exercised as a group after discussion and
consensus 1* The Board also concluded that because the resolutions
passed by the faculty were reviewable by the university's board of
trustees, the faculty members were not managerial employees who act
in the interest of management."
The issue of faculty unionization presented the Board with the difficulty of squaring the university system of authority with the industrial model upon which the Act was based. 59 The clear and distinct
lines of authority present in industry are neither clear nor distinct in a
university where, under a shared-authority system of governance,
faculty members participate in the administration of the university.'
Thus, the principles developed by the Board for use in the industrial
world were not acceptable when applied to the academic community. 1
Because the Board recognized the inherent differences between the
academic and commercial worlds, it restricted the use of the industrial
model and attempted to balance the competing organizational policies
of the Act with the need to develop a consistent standard to be applied
to the university setting.62 Applying these criteria to university
faculties, the Board sought to reconcile the degree of faculty control
3
with the faculty's need for academic freedom.
In determining faculty bargaining units, the Board was confronted
with whether faculty members were employees under the Act. While
colleges and universities consistently opposed faculty unionization on
the ground that faculty members were managers or supervisors, the
faculty argued that their status as professionals protected them from
the supervisory exclusion."
The Board has excluded managerial employees from the coverage of
the Act because their inclusion could lead to conflicts of interest and
divided loyalties. 5 In the Board's analysis, the controlling factor is the
56. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971).
57. Id- at 905.

58. Id
59. See AdeIphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972).
60. 54 WASH. L. REv. 843 (1979). In the Medievel period, universities were run solely
by faculty members. McHugh, Collective Bargainingwith Professionals in HigherEduca-

tion: Problems in Unit Determinations, 1971 Wisc. L.
61.
62.

REV.

55, 65.

Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973).
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.

63. Id.
64. See C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 904; Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 639;
Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. at 642.
65. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 (1974). See also note 4 supra.
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employee's alignment with management, because without such an
allegiance there would be no danger of divided loyalties. Concluding
that a mere involvement with policy-making is not the equivalent of an
alignment with management," the Board fashioned a test for
managerial status requiring an ability to formulate or effectuate
employer policies,M and an accountability to higher authority. 9
Because of the skill and expertise possessed by professionals, their
judgments are often implemented by management, resulting in a
camouflage of the differences between managerial and professional
personnel. 0 Professional employees have been protected from exclusion where the exercise of their professional judgment was limited by
standards formulated by the employer," or where the exercise of their
judgment affected merely the quality of work at particular job sites.72
Because such authority was exercised routinely or in a rigid and
technical manner, it was not considered to be managerial.73 Professionalism could not, however, shield an employee from managerial
status where he possessed the ability to formulate and effectuate
management policy, or exercised discretion independent of his
employer's established policy."
Although the Board had determined the status of professionals in an
industrial context, the academic community presented it with the additional problem of dealing with faculties who did not fall exclusively into either the managerial or professional category, but who tended to
exhibit characteristics of both categories.75 Thus, the Board was faced
66. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 286.
67. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
68. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 267.
69. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905; Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5
U. TOL. L. Rv. 608, 618 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NLRB in Higher Education].
70. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 858 (1974).
71. National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1441-42 (1966). In National Broadcasting newsroom "deskmen" who edited and determined broadcast material and assigned
other newsmen to certain stories were found not be managerial because their respon-

sibility was limited by standards set by the employer for the broadcast. Id.
72.

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920, 921 (1971). Although the ar-

chitects assigned to job sites as project managers could recommend assignments of overtime, benefits, or discipline of other employees, they had no final authority. Their responsibility was for the quality of work at the job site. Id.
73. General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 858. In General Dynamics engineers
were found not to be managers because their judgment was exercised routinely while
practicing their profession. Id.
74. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. at 276.
75. Faculty members influence the hiring, transfer, discipline, and tenure of their

fellow employees, thereby exhibiting characteristics of a supervisor. See National Labor
Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). At the same time they are highly trained
individuals whose work is predominantly intellectual and as such meet the requirements
of the Act for characterization as professionals. See id. § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
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with the task of developing a unique standard. The test had to be
broad enough to be applicable to the different systems which have
developed in universities throughout the country, yet narrow enough
to serve as a realistic guide so that Board intervention would not be
necessary in every case.
In response to this need, the Board developed a three-part analysis.
In formulating the first part of its analysis, the Board concluded that
faculty authority, exercised collectively, did not place faculty members
in the supervisory or managerial categories."' Because the supervisory
exclusion enunciated in the Act refers to authority exercised by individuals,77 the Board reasoned that faculty activities are distinguishable
from those of supervisors or managerial employees because faculty
members exercise their authority on a collective basis. 8 Those faculty
members who serve on university committees were deemed to be acting as representatives of the collective faculty rather than in their individual interest. This representative capacity shielded the individuals
who by virtue of their tenure or position were able to influence university policy. 9 Second, the Board concluded that because a university's
board of trustees generally reserves the right to review and reject
faculty proposals, the faculty's power is not exercised independently of
the university. 0 Finally, the Board declared that faculty interests often
differ from those of the university management, negating an alignment
between the faculty and university. 1 The presence of these three factors led the Board to conclude that university faculty members were
professional and not managerial employees.2 The three-part test
became the foundation for all faculty unit determination cases," and
was the basis for the Board's ruling in Yeshiva."
76. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
77. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), refers to a supervisory employee as "an individual" who exercises any one of the enumerated powers.
78. Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. at 135. Compare Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026,
1027 & n.4. Seton Hill overruled Fordham to the extent that members of the Society of Jesus
at Fordham who were included in the bargaining unit with lay faculty members could no
longer be included. In Seton Hill the Board excluded the members of the Sisters of Charity
from the bargaining unit because the Board feared their inclusion would create conflicts of interest Id.
79. Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. at 135.
80. C.W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. at 905. See also Adelphi Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. at
648. The Board in Adelphi concluded that it was the right to review faculty proposals
rather than the exercise of that right which was determinative of faculty nonsupervisory
status. Id.
81. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
82. See, e.g., University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. at 634.
83. See, e.g., Wentworth Inst., 210 N.L.R.B. 345 (1974), enforced, 515 F.2d 550 (1st
Cir. 1975); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973).
84. 444 U.S. at 685. The Board abandoned two prongs of its three pronged analysis in
its brief and oral argument before the Supreme Court. Id. at 685 n.20.
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In addition to this three-part analysis, the Board in Yeshiva proferred a faculty status test based on the exercise of their independent
professional judgment.8 5 Because faculties exercise their influence by
drawing upon their skill and expertise as educators rather than out of
concern for compliance with university policy, the Board in Yeshiva
concluded that such an exercise of authority would not result in a division of loyalties."
The Supreme Court in Yeshiva declared that the three-part analysis
as well as the independent judgment test proferred by the Board had
no basis in the Act.8 7 Rather than granting the findings of the Board
the deference which they are normally accorded,8 the Court criticized
the Board's use of the three-part analysis as a substitute for fact-finding." The Court did not state the extent to which the Board is forced
to articulate its findings of facts. In Yeshiva, the Board-appointed hearing officer conducted five months of evidentiary hearings resulting in a
voluminous record adopted by the Board. ° It is clear that the Court
has rejected the Board's use of the three-part analysis either as a
standard which the Board may apply to the particular facts before it or
as a substitute for fact finding in faculty unit determination cases." It
is unclear, however, whether the Court rejected the analysis because it
is not supportable under the Act or because the Board consistently
used the test without developed factual determinations."
Because the Supreme Court rejected the Board's three-part analysis
and independent professional judgment test, the Board is faced with
again developing criteria to determine faculty status. The Court
pointed to prior Board determinations93 of the status of non-academic
professional employees as a starting point for this analysis."4 The professionals in the cases cited by the Court exercised a limited amount of
authority over non-unit personnel.95 In these cases the Board had deter85. Id. at 684. The Board contended that a university requires the constant professional input of the faculty and deemed this input to be an exercise of independent professional judgment. The Board cited no precedent in support of the independent professional
judgment test. See Brief of the Petitioner at 30.
86. 444 U.S. at 684.
87. Id. at 691.
88. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 501; NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local
449, 353 U.S. at 96.
89. 444 U.S. at 685.
90. 231 N.L.R.B. at 597 n.1.
91. See 444 U.S. at 691.
92. Id.
93. See Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1971); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920 (1971); National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440
(1966).
94. 444 U.S. at 690 n.30.
95. Id. See also text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
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mined that the sporadic exercise of supervisory authority did not
result in conflicts of interest," nor did infrequent exercises of supervisory authority so ally the employee with management as to place
him within the managerial exclusion. 7 The Supreme Court in Yeshiva
has directed the Board to make faculty determinations by using the rationale of these non-faculty cases as a starting point for its analysis. 8
The result of this directive is to cause faculty members to be treated
not as a unique group entitled to unique standards, but as typical professional employees. This implication is contradictory to the recognized
distinction between the industrial and educational contexts with which
the Court itself has indicated agreement.9 The majority accurately
pointed out that the Act was designed to accomodate managementemployee relations in private industry where the chain of command is
pyramidal." However, most universities are governed by a sharedauthority system under which faculties participate in the administration of the institution through committees with ultimate authority
resting in the board of trustees. 9 ' Because the two systems are inherently different, the distinctions which apply to the industrial context have little validity in the university setting."' Yet, by establishing
as guidelines for the academic community standards developed for nonacademic professionals working in industrial settings,"3 the Court has
directed the Board to follow a procedure which it has recognized as unsound.""
The court's directive will ultimately limit the Act's coverage to
those faculty members whose authority is not consistently exercised in
the daily operation of the institution."' Most faculty members,
however, do not confine their involvement in the institution to their
performance in the classroom. Rather, their influence permeates the
university system of governance under the shared-authority system. 18
It follows that after Yeshiva, few faculty members will be afforded
coverage under the Act.
Mary F. Dombrowski
96. See National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. at 1442.
97. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 859; Doctor's Hosp. of Modesto, 183
N.L.R.B. 950 (1970), enforced, 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
98. 444 U.S. at 690 n.31.
99. Id. at 680.
100. Id. at 681.
101. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
102. See Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. at 643.
103. 444 U.S. at 690 n.30.
104. See id. at 680-81.
105. See id. at 690 n.31. The Court indicated that faculty members will not be excluded
where their judgment is exercised in determining course content, student evaluation, or
research projects. Id.
106. NLRB in Higher Education, supra note 69, at 616.

